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THE MISADVENTURE OF COPYRIGHTING STATE LAW
Eric E. Johnson'
ABSTRACT

Many states have asserted copyright over their own official state legal texts,
limiting access to those materialsand attempting to monetize them. This Article aims
to provide helpful analysisfor state officials decidingwhether to pursue suchpolicies
andfor courts reviewing challenges to such practices.Priorscholarship in this area
has focused on the issue of whether such copyright assertionscan be valid under
federal law given the inherent conflicts they pose to due process and democratic
ideals. This Article aims to expand this dialogue in a couple of ways-first, by
situating the controversy within the broaderarc of legal history, and second, by
focusing on matters of present-daypracticalities and economics. In so doing, the
thrust of this Article is to go beyond arguing that states must surrender their
copyright claims over state legal materialsand to concentrateinstead on providing
reasonswhy states shouldsee it in their own interestand the interestof their citizens
to renounce such claims. The policy arguments this Article sets out-includingwith
regardto business behavior, politicalengagement, andfiscalresponsibility nd up
providing not merely reasons for states to abstain from aggressive copyright
claiming, but also reasonsfor reviewing courts to deny such claims, including by
way offair use analysis.
With the aim ofproviding insight into matters ofpracticalityand economics, this
Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. For comments, feedback,
and
helpful conversations, I am grateful to Chris Odinet, Erin Sheley, Melissa Mortazavi, Roger Michalski,
Diedre Keller, Guy A. Rub, Marshall Leaffer, Dan Chow, Sam Ernst, Amanda Reid, Josh Sarnoff, Doris
Long, Peter Yu, Bob Hu, Ned Snow, and Kit Johnson. I also thank Bethany Davenport, Mat Payne, and
the rest of the members of the Kentucky Law Journalfor their very excellent work on this symposium.
Note that throughout this article, various state-law citations are to proprietary published materials.
See, e.g., infra note 13 (citing to the West publication of the California Code). This has been done in
accordance with the most recent edition of The Bluebook, which instructs that statutes are to be cited either
to the West Annotated Calfornia Codes or Deering's California Codes, Annotated. See THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, at 252 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed.
2015). These are proprietary sources. When recently checked, West's Annotated California Codes was
available for a one-time purchase of $17,245 or a monthly price of $1,114. See West's Annotated
California
Codes,
THOMPSON
REUTERS,
https://store.legal.thomsonreuters.com/lawproducts/Statutes/Westsreg-Annotated-California-Codes-Annotated-Statute--Code-Series/p/1 00028444
[https://perma.cc/7A6G-JF7F]. Deering'sCaliforniaCodes Annotated, which is published by LexisNexis,
was priced
at $4,664.
See Deering's Califormia Codes Annotated, LEXISNEXIS
STORE,
https://store.lexisnexis.com/products/deerings-califomia-codes-annotated-skuSKU7329/details
[https://perma.cc/42LF-J9VS]. The Bluebook's requirement to cite to such expensive sources is indicative
of the entanglement of the law and our means of communicating about it with monetized access points.
With regard to citations to state court cases, I am grateful for the Kentucky Law Journal'sforbearance in
permitting cites first to official state reporters followed by parallel citations to West regional reporters,
notwithstanding The Bluebook's contrary instruction.
This article: V 2019 Eric E. Johnson, licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA 4.0 License,
available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. Konomark-most rights sharable: If you
would like to use this material beyond the scope of the Creative Commons license, please contact the
author at ericejohnson.com.
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Article assumes that state legislators andofficials are acting in goodfaith-andare
not motivated by a desire to undermine constitutionalvalues-when they enter into
deals with private legal publishers to monetize official state legal information. The
question is, then, whatgood-faith motivations might a state have in attempting to use
copyright to put official state legal information behind a paywall? I look at the
plausible answers and respond to them. One answer is that proprietary/closed
-access systems are "low cost." I explain why this is an economic misunderstanding.
Another reason is a strongfaith that public-private partnerships are an efficient
means of delivering public goods. I explain why a public-private partnership
structure in this context is problematic. Another reason is a beliefthat harm done by
limitations on access to the law is merely of theoretical or academic concern.
I explain why that is not the case.
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INTRODUCTION

Going back more than a century, states have sought to make exclusive copyright
claims over the official written texts that embody state law-statutes, annotated
codes, and judicial opinions. In practice, states do this through exclusive deals with
legal publishers. A hundred years ago, this translated into higher prices for law
books. Today, this means the law ends up in databases accessible via paid
subscriptions, with pricing pitched at law-firm levels. Nominal alternative access is
provided with cumbersome paper copies in selected libraries or through frustrating
web-based access of a sufficiently low quality that it can push searchers to pay for
proprietary access or give up. Many scholars and activists find these practices deeply
troubling, and they have worked to craft arguments to persuade courts to reject state
copyright claims that would restrict access to official legal materials.
Yet state legislators and officials in great numbers seem to see their states'
practices as untroubling. In this Article, I hope to offer reasoning persuasive not only
to reviewing courts but to the state decisionmakers themselves who choose
proprietary closed-access publishing arrangements and are motivated to fight for
them when challenged.
I do not believe state officials and legislators choose pay-for-access publishing
because they are out to undermine due process, the rule of law, economic liberty, or
the foundations of democracy. But I hope to explain why using copyright claims over
state law does all these things-and not in a merely theoretical way that only a purist
or academic could care about, but in a meaningful, real-world way that we should all
care about. Along the way, I hope to show why state decisionmakers should be
worried that frustrating access to official state law materials increases transaction
costs and legal uncertainty, thus acting as a drag on the economy.
Because I am focused on the public-policy choice to restrict or open up access to
the written law, I will not be focusing on copyright doctrine itself. The analysis in
this piece should, however, be helpful to courts in deciding copyright cases in this
area, since public-policy analysis plugs into the legal analysis of copyright in a few
ways-including with regard to issues of copyrightability and fair use. But the
audience I am keeping most in mind are state legislators and state officials. I hope to
persuade them to pursue a policy of making the letter of the law maximally accessible
without payments, subscriptions, terms of service, or anything else that would come
between the law itself and those who want to know about it.
It will be easy to lose our bearings in this controversy if we do not
straightforwardly acknowledge some subtleties. When considering the views of
open-access advocates on the one side and profit-seeking publishers on the other, it
is important to see that the choice is not between an open society and a secret-police
state. Pay-to-access publishing companies and open-access proponents alike are
keenly aware of the societal value of legal information. And everyone on all sides of
this issue would agree with the phrase, "The public should have access to the law."
But what does "the law" mean in such a statement?
This is where we encounter important nuances. Is "the law" to which the public
needs free access just the text of statutes passed by the legislature and the raw
opinions issued by the courts? (That would seem to be the position of
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proprietary-access proponents.) Or does "the law" to which the public needs access
also include numbering, annotations, headnotes, and other things provided by the
state to facilitate understanding of and accurate reference to the law? And what
would count as "access"? Is it enough, for instance, to have a single state-sanctioned
website that requires agreement to terms and conditions, allows no outside linking to
internal pages, and has only crude search capabilities?2
These are the real choices at stake. Thus, let me be clear that I am arguing for the
strong version of the proposition-that access to state legal material should be
unlimited; that everyone should be free to copy, rearrange, and re-publish all official,
state-owned information about the law; and that anyone should be allowed to
innovate with new tools for searching it and making use of it.
A recent legal battle has encapsulated the real-world embodiment of the choices
involved in copyrighting state law--the State of Georgia's copyright lawsuit against
the non-profit corporation Public.Resource.Org, Inc.' I will use that litigation and its
underlying facts as a recurring example in talking about questions of public access
to official state-owned legal information. But this article is not about that litigation
as such, and I intend for my analysis to be helpful long after the Georgia controversy
passes into the books. As I discuss below, governments have waxed and waned in
their willingness to allow citizens maximal access to the law. And they have done
this for a very long time-thousands of years, in fact. Thus it seems likely the
question will endure as to the extent to which states should provide free access to the
letter of the law.
Part I of this Article frames the issue historically and gives some background on
copyright law. Part II reviews the principal public-policy concepts that have often
driven courts to reject government copyright claims over legal materials-those
being due-process/rule-of-law concerns and the notion of the people's authorhood of
the law. Part III lists plausible reasons that state legislators and officials would be
attracted to a closed/pay-for-access system and then offers corresponding responses
grounded in practicality and economics.
I. SOME HISTORY: FROM BABYLON TO ATLANTA

In this Part, I will provide a whirlwind tour of the history of public access to the
written letter of the law-from ancient times through the modern era. In bringing us
2 These have been problemis in the recent past with Lexis-provided li-ee access, as documented in recent
litigation. See DecL of Clay Johnson, submitted as Ex. K with Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 5-8,
Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-02594-MHC (N.D. Ga. May 17, 2016),
https//law.resource.org/pub/us/codega/provgeorgia/gov.uscourts.gand.21835429.13.pdf
[https//permacc2BAP-3M3C]. Notably, when I checked in December 2018, the Lexis site seemed considerably
improved along these lines, although it seems plausible that these improvements were provoked by current litigation
and could thus prove transitory.
The Eleventh Circuit opinion is Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org,
906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018). The Eleventh Circuit docket is available at
https://Iaw.resource.org/pub/us/code/ga/pro v_georgia/appeal_11thcircuit/gov.uscourts.call.1
The Northern District of Georgia docket is available at
7-11589_Docket.html.
https://law.resource.org/pub/us/code/ga/pro v_georgia/gov.uscourts.gand.218354.docket.html.

2018-2019

COPYRIGHTING STATE LAW

597

up to the present day, I briefly recount the evolution of copyright doctrine in this
area. In talking about copyright, I will not systematically review the relevant cases.
Others have done so.4 Instead, I will provide some examples of state attempts to
make access to the law proprietary and copyright law's reactions to these.
The selected-highlights history presented here will help to convey the
fundamental nature of what is at stake. As will become clear, the history of citizen
access to the law is, in the context of Anglo-American law, tied to the greater arc of
the history of Western Civilization and the long-lasting struggle over its essential
values.
A. Ancient Times
The issue of public access to the law has a history as long as the history of law
itself. With reflection, that is not surprising as the same things that made ancient law
accessible to the public also served to preserve it for archeologists.
Among the earliest known sources of written law is the Code of Hammurabi of
Babylon.s More than 3,700 years old, it was the eponymous work of the great King
Hammurabi,6 who established Babylon as a sprawling empire covering the Fertile
Crescent.7
The Code of Hammurabi was discovered by archeologists in the winter of
1901-1902 as a set of carvings on a monument of black volcanic rock.' The stone
slab-almost eight feet high and more than five feet around 9 -is engirdled with a list
of laws numbered one to 282, plus an introduction and an epilogue.'o These laws
embrace a wide array of subjects-contracts, torts, agency, and jurisdiction, among
others." In terms of its legal substance, the Code of Hammurabi has both surprising

See Irma Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in PrimaryLaw Materials, 23 HASTINGS

COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81, 84-97 (2000) (providing a brief history of cases involving copyright and
publisher-exclusivity claims over primary legal materials in the states); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce,
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of CopyrightProtectionfor Law Reports andStatutory Compilations,

36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 749-82 (1989) (reviewing and working to synthesize principal cases elucidating

&

copyright doctrine in this area, with a particular emphasis on the issue of "star pagination," the in-line
notation of a prior volume's page breaks); see also J. Denis Moran, Copyright; Words and Phrases, in 81
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 45, 45-55 (1993-1994) (reviewing
cases and providing a synthesis, relying heavily on Patterson & Joyce, supra); I MELVILLE B. NIMMER
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.12 (2018). In a related vein, see Timothy K. Armstrong,
Crowdsourcing and Open Access: Collaborative Techniques for Disseminating Legal Materials and
Scholarship, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., 591, 597-98 (2010) for a discussion about
crowdsourced efforts at open-access to primary legal materials.
5Erwin

J. Urch, The Law Code ofHammurabi, 15 A.B.A. J. 437, 437 (1929).

See id

6

7id.

8 Donald G. McNeil, The Code ofHammurabi, 53 A.B.A. J. 444, 444 (1967).
9 Urch, supra note 5, at 438.
1o
The
Code
of
Hammurabi, THE
AVALON
PROJECT
http://avalon.aw.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp [https.//pennacc/LUS3-DRXK].
" McNeil, supra note 8, at 446; Urch, supra note 5, at 440.

(L.

W.

King,

trans.),
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modem relevancel 2 and cringy ancient harshness.13
Ensuring public access to the law seems to have been an integral part of
Hammurabi's code project and its concomitant commitment to justice. 14
Hammurabi's epilogue to the code provides:
[L]et the oppressed, who has a case at law, come and stand before this
my image as king of righteousness; let him read the inscription, and
understand my precious words: the inscription will explain his case to
him; he will find out what is just, and his heart will be glad ... 15
Not all ancients were in accord, however. Hammurabi's devotion to the
accessibility of the text of the law, in fact, stands in stark contrast to the situation
many centuries later in Ancient Rome under the infamous Emperor Caligula. The
reign of Caligula was a catalog of horrors. Among other things, he is said to have
relieved his boredom during intermission at a gladiator event by ordering an entire
section of the audience thrown into the arena to be eaten by animals."
Given that context, it is notable that a modem court would call Caligula's
implementation of a closed-access policy to legal information "[o]ne of the most
hateful acts" of his reign.'I Having promulgated tax laws, Caligula initially refused
12 As a result of Hammurabi's commitment to making law accessible-and choosing basalt as a
publishing medium-his code has continuing usefulness as it continues to be cited by courts right up to
the present. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491 (2008) (regarding awarding of
multiple damages for particularly harmful acts, citing to the Code of Hammurabi's ten-times damages
measure for stealing a goat); Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 171 Wash. 2d 587, 612, 257 P.3d 532, 545
(2011) (rejecting the firm's arguments, in a negligence suit against an engineering firm for a collapse at a
sewage treatment facility, regarding duty and proximate causation with citation to the Code of Hammurabi
for the proposition that house builders were liable for collapses of houses not built strong enough).
" As one example, Section 7 provides that buying a sheep without a contract or witness was
constructive theft and punishable by death. The Code of Hammurabi, supra note 10, at § 7. 1 take it that
whatever is signified by the English word "contract" in the translation refers to a written contract in the
original. Any legitimate sale representing a mutually agreed upon exchange between two parties, in the
absence of a written agreement, could be construed as a contract formed by words or conduct. See, e.g.,
CAL. COM. CODE § 2201 (West 2018) (stating that some sales contracts need not be in writing); id. § 2204
(asserting that contracts can be manifested by conduct alone).
14 The text was widely published. See Urch, supra note 5, at 438. In addition, the monumental form
of the stele testifies to an emphasis on the law being viewable by all. See id. (discussing the form of the
stele). Notably, the code's epilogue also references the form of publication-"upon memorial stone"-in
saluting its own accessibility to the public. The Code of Hammurabi, supra note 10, at The Epilogue
("I have in Babylon the city where Anu and Bel raise high their head, in E-Sagil, the Temple, whose
foundations stand firm as heaven and earth, in order to bespeak justice in the land, to settle all disputes,
and heal all injuries, set up these my precious words, written upon my memorial stone. . . .").
15 The Code of Hammurabi, supra note 10, at The Epilogue. Other references are "and pious statute
did he teach the land," "let righteousness go forth in the land: by the order of Marduk, my lord, let no
destruction befall my monument," "[w]hen he reads the record, let him pray with full heart to Marduk,"
and "I expounded all great difficulties, I made the light shine upon them." Id.
16 GREGORY S. ALDRETE, DAILY LIFE IN THE ROMAN CYTY 124 (2004) ("Once at some games at

which he was presiding, the emperor Caligula became bored because there were no criminals to be
executed during the intermission. His solution was to order his guards to throw an entire section of the
crowd into the arena to be eaten by animals.").
" Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 5, 97 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. 1953) ("One of the most hateful acts
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to post those laws in public view at all-thus ensnaring citizens in a legal trap.' 8
When Caligula finally gave in to the people's demands to make the laws public, he
famously did so by posting them high up and in small letters-with the aim of
preventing citizens from reading them or making a copy.19 Caligula thus exerts a
continuing influence on the law today as an example of law done wrong. In
particular, U.S. courts have used Caligula's closed-access publication as an analogy
for explaining what is fundamentally unfair about excessively vague statutes-that
they are "a trap for the innocent," incompatible with fundamental justice.20
Hundreds of years later in Rome, the tides had shifted to the other extreme when
Emperor Justinian I undertook to codify Roman law, one of the primary aims of the
project being to make the law accessible at low cost.21 His digests attest to this:
In the future may they have laws that are straightforward as well as
brief, and easily available to all, and also such that it is easy to possess the
books containing them, so that men may not need to obtain with a great
expenditure of wealth volumes containing a large quantity of redundant
laws, but the means of procuring them for a trifling sum may be given to
22
both rich and poor and great learning be available at a very small cost.
Thus it was that two millennia ago a Roman emperor articulated an aspiration not
much different than that championed by open-access advocates today. It should be
noted that there were some aspects of Justinian's code project that would be
unwelcome to modem proponents of open access. For one, he did not tolerate bootleg
copies of his code; he also condemned secondary sources. 23 But, in context, his
of the ill-famed Roman tyrant Caligula was that of having the laws inscribed upon pillars so high that the
people could not read them.").
" 1 SUETONIUs, THE LIVES OF THE CAESARS: GAIUS CALIGULA 469 (G. P. Goold ed., J. C. Rolfe
trans., 1913) ("When taxes of this kind had been proclaimed, but not published in writing, inasmuch as
many offences were committed through ignorance of the letter of the law, he at last, on the urgent demand
of the people, had the law posted up, but in a very narrow place and in excessively small letters, to prevent
the making of a copy.").

" Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Indeed, it is
not unlike the practice of Caligula, who reportedly 'wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung
them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people."' (citing I W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1765))); SuEToNIus, supra note 18, at 469.
20

See, e.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1952) ("Words which are vague and fluid

may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula. We cannot sanction taking a
man by the heels for refusing to grant the permission which [the statute under consideration] on its face

apparently gave him the right to withhold." (citation omitted)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 774-75
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that vague statutes are constitutionally defective because "[n]o
one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes"

(quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814,
834 n.* (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("For application of a law that sends people to prison for years
where Congress has not made it clear they should be there is only another device as lacking in due process
as Caligula's practice of printing the laws in small print and placing them so high on a wall that the
ordinary man did not receive fair warning." (citation omitted)).
21
22

lain Stewart, Mors Codicis: End ofthe Age ofCodification?,27 TuL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 17, 23, 30 (2012).
PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI'S TExTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 62 (5th ed. 2015).

2 Stewart, supra note 21, at 33 (2012).
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directives along these lines should be understood as means of ensuring accuracy and
uniformity-which in turn serve the overarching goal of protecting citizen access to
the law.24 Justinian's values regarding the publication of the written law are
foundational to the civilian legal tradition and deeply influential on the common law
as well.
B. Modern Times
Let's fast-forward to 1848 A.D., when American law-reformer David Dudley
Field succeeded in getting the state of New York to adopt a code of civil procedure
to replace its then byzantine doctrines of common-law pleading.25 Field's trailblazing
work-which became known as the Field Code-served as a model for the
later-created Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.26
Important for our purposes, at least part of what motivated Field was that he
despised the idea of law being closed off to citizens.2 He found it unacceptable that
to comprehend the law one would have to search through reported cases-an
exercise that left the law discernable only to trained lawyers and those who could
hire them. 28 Field maligned case reporters as "sealed books." 29 He saw his code as
the remedy. 0
To gain acceptance of his code, Field had to convince lawyers and judges that it
was a good idea, and he promoted it as a labor-saving device for the bench and bar."
But he also made an argument with a more society-wide focus: He claimed that the
"publication of a [c]ode will diffuse among the people a more general and accurate
2
knowledge of their rights and duties, than can be obtained in any other manner."3
After Field's success with civil practice, he went on to contracts, torts, and
property,3 3 trying "to set out principles of law exhaustively, concisely, and with great
clarity of language." 34 Field was not as successful when it came to codifying
substantive law as he was with procedural law.35 But the broader efforts of Field and
his fellow reformers did bear fruit as the "spiritual parents" of the American Law
Institute's Restatements of Law,36 a project which sought to take the decentralized
24 See id.
2 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 293-94 (3d ed. 2005); Eric E. Johnson,
Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 548 (2010).
26 Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical
JurisprudenceofAnticodification, 19 YALE J. L. & HuMAN. 149, 152-54 (2007).
27
See id. at 153-54.
28 See id. at 153-54,
157.
29 Johnson, supra note 25, at
548.
3o Grossman, supra note 26, at 152-54.
31 Id. at 153-54.
32 Id.

33 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 302.
34 Id.

" See Grossman, supra note 26, at 154-55 (discussing Field's success in getting California to adopt
his Civil Code, in modified form in 1872, but noting that the California courts moved to a practice of
interpreting the code such that they operated in a common-law mode).
36

FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 304.
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web of pronouncements in the common law and distill them to easily understood
statute-like precepts.3 7

Matching Field's work as an example of the recurring project to open up the law
to public access, there are also many modem examples of the recurring impulse to
remove the law from the public domain and tie it up with proprietary arrangements.
In 1906, for instance, the State of Nebraska argued to its state supreme court that
the opinions of that court should be subject to proprietary ownership, so that sales of
copies could fund the purchase of books for the state library.38 The Supreme Court
of Nebraska pointedly disagreed that the purpose of publishing its opinions was to
raise money-it was, the court thought, "to make the opinions of the court easily
accessible to all the citizens." 9
A particularly useful example-because it compellingly compares to the
present-day controversy in Georgia-is that of Connecticut in the 1880s. The State
of Connecticut entered into a deal to make Banks & Brothers the exclusive publisher
of the Supreme Court of Connecticut's decisions.' Connecticut patted itself on the
back for an arrangement that allowed the public to get the material at what it saw as
a fair price-$2.00 per volume.41 When a rival publisher challenged the arrangement,
seeking to publish the opinions quicker and cheaper in a weekly magazine, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut repulsed it, holding that state officials could not be
compelled to give copies of new opinions to the magazine to transcribe on the
rationale that doing so would breach the state's contract.42 The court reasoned, "The
judges and the reporter are paid by the state, and the product of their mental labor is
the property of the state, and the state .. . has taken to itself the copyright... . It is
for the state to say when and in what manner it will publish these volumes."4 3
C. Most Recently
Today, public access to the letter of the law continues to be a contested concept,
and Connecticut's stance 136 years ago is strangely echoed today in Georgia.
The state government of Georgia, through its legislatively created Code Revision
Commission (CRC)," has aggressively pursued a copyright claim against
Public.Resource.Org, a non-profit organization that seeks to allow the public to
freely download Georgia's official code, the Official Code of Georgia Annotated

1 See id.
38 See Nebraska v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 752, 754-55, 110 N.W. 763, 764 (1906).
" Id.; see also Dmitrieva, supra note 4, at 110 (citing the case as an example of states attempting to
generate revenue from publishing legal materials).
' See In re Gould & Co., 53 Conn. 415, 419; 2 A. 886, 896 (Conn. 1885).
42

See id.

4 Rep. Johnnie Caldwll Issues Statement on CopyrightLawsuit, GA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIwES (July 29,
2015), http://www.house.gagov/mediaServices/en-US/pressReleases.aspx [https//permacclUT4Y-ZXDA].
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"

(OCGA).45 Led by open-access advocate Carl Malamud," Public.Resource.Org
purchased a print copy of the ostensibly copyrighted OCGA, scanned it, and posted
it in the open on the web.4 7 Not shy about its willingness to get into a fight, the
organization sent copies on flash drives to various Georgia legislators.48 The CRC
sued and won its motion for partial summary judgment in the district court, 49 but that
victory was later overturned by the Eleventh Circuit, which held the annotations in
the OCGA to be uncopyrightable.so (At the time of this writing, CRC and the State
of Georgia have petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.")
The State of Georgia argued that it held the copyright to the OCGA annotations,52
and on that basis, Georgia has a deal with Lexis purportedly giving Lexis exclusive
publishing rights to the OCGA and its annotations." Georgia argued to the Eleventh
Circuit that its deal with Lexis "reflects the success of the Georgia General Assembly
in providing tangible benefits . . . to its citizens while still maintaining a small
government footprint and low taxes."54 Like Connecticut did in the 1800s, Georgia
today trumpets the arrangement for making the law available to citizens at what it
sees as a fair price: just $404 for a complete printed copy.ss As to the non-profit's
stance that the official code would be better for citizens of Georgia if it were free,
the state riposted, "These irresponsible and uninformed opinions of third parties
should not dictate how the sovereign State of Georgia provides benefits to its
citizens." 6
The technical thrust of Georgia's argument is that the OCGA includes
annotations of various sorts-that is, text other than the law itself." Thus, Georgia
has argued that it is not restricting the distribution of the plain statutory text, which
it maintains people are free to copy." But Georgia's stance on the free reproducibility
of statutory text was not a willing policy choice. Georgia already tried and failed to
claim exclusive rights over the statutory text itself5
In the 1982 case of Georgia v. Harrison Co., the State of Georgia filed a
' The latest in the case is the issuance of an opinion by a panel of the Eleventh Circuit. Code Revision
Comm'n ex rel. Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
6 See Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly
of Ga., & the State of Ga. at 11, Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d
1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-11589) (listing Carl Malamud as the founder of the organization).
4 Code Revision, 906 F.3d at 1235.

49 Id.

so Id. at 1255.
" See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., No. 18-1150 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2019),
https/www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/-181150/90326/20190301141255519_Georgia/2oCertiorai/20
Petition%20-/20to%20Printer.pdf [https*//permacdRKV7-R36U].
52 Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly of
Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 2-3, 20-21.
53
Id. at 3-5, 19.
4 Id. at 19.
55

id.

Id. at 20.
7
Id. at 20-21.
5 See id. at 18, 20-21.
' Id. at 18.
56
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copyright infringement suit against a legal publisher that had, without Georgia's
authorization, published a preliminary version of the codification of Georgia
statutes.' The preliminary version had been prepared and distributed with the aim
of soliciting comments before the code's effective date." Michie-the authorized
publisher and a precursor to present-day Lexis-registered the copyright for Georgia
to use in its lawsuit. 62 Georgia argued that prior cases denying copyright over statutes
were ones where the alleged copyright holder was an individual, not a state
government. 63 Thus, Georgia argued, its copyright over its own law was not excluded
by stare decisis and should be upheld.' The tack didn't work: The court denied the
injunction and held that states were, like everyone else, unentitled to a copyright over
law.6 5

Another state that has been aggressive in claiming copyright over its law is
Oregon-but it eventually took a different path than Georgia. In 2008, Oregon's
Office of Legislative Counsel sent cease-and-desist letters to the operators of
websites that had openly posted Oregon's official code, the Oregon Revised Statutes
(ORS).' In one such letter, to the website Justia, Oregon's attorney asserted that the
ORS was the copyrighted work of the state's Legislative Counsel Committee. 67 The
letter explained that the committee did not claim copyright over "the text of the law
itself," but the committee did claim copyright in, among other things, the
arrangement of the law's text and the numbering of the sections.6
Amiable in tone, Oregon's letter acknowledged Justia's public-interest mission
but nonetheless insisted that posting the ORS on the web was illegal.6 ' As a rationale
for the necessity of copyright enforcement, the letter offered that ORS sales and
licensing revenue financially supported the Legislative Counsel Committee's work
in compiling, publishing, and, ironically, "making the law accessible to the public."o
Thus, Oregon's counsel invited Justia to enter into good-faith negotiations for a
license-or else face a copyright lawsuit."
The exchange of letters was made public, and Oregon faced an onslaught of
o See Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 111-13 (N.D. Ga. 1982), vacatedper stipulation,
559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
61
,1d. at 112-13.
62

id

63

Id. at 114.
6 Id.
6
1Id. at 115, 117.
' Notably, the ORS lacked the kind of annotations that are woven into the OCGA and form the
proffered distinguishing factor that Georgia has been hoping will give it a different outcome in its current
battle against Public.Resource.Org. See, e.g., Letter from Dexter Johnson, Legislative Counsel, Or.
Legislative Counsel Comm., to Tim Stanley, Chief Exec. Officer, Justia Inc. (Apr. 7, 2008),
https://public.resource.org/scribd/2526821.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6XK-P5WZ].
67
id,

6 Id.
6 Id. ("Although we applaud the public interest mission of Justia Inc. to make the law easy to find
and use at no charge, the fact remains that your company has illegally displayed the copyrighted work
product of the Committee ....

70

id.

71 id
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criticism.72 But in addition to being bad policy in the minds of many, Oregon's
position was also-as many pointed out-legally untenable.73 Oregon's lawyers
must have quickly concluded the same thing. In the end, Oregon said it was choosing
not to enforce a claim of copyright over the text of the ORS.74
Idaho is a state with still a different experience. In 1949, the Idaho legislature
passed a law providing that copyright in statutory compilations would be taken in
7
the name of the state's chosen publishing company and then assigned to the state. s
Thus, at that time, Idaho chose to pursue a closed-access/proprietary model. In 1993,
Idaho redoubled its position by adding to its law a new code section titled "Idaho
Code is property of the state of Idaho."" The section specified that the taxpayers and
the state have a copyright on the code and provided that anyone who copied or
distributed the law for commercial advantage-even if indirect-would owe
royalties, and copies could be impounded.77 In purporting to create a copyright
entitlement, prescribing the test for infringement, and providing for remedies, the
Idaho statute is a nullity, as it is unambiguously preempted by federal law. But the
implication was clear: Idaho would use the full machinery of the state to enforce any
arguable claim under federal law to prevent people from copying and distributing
Idaho law. Then in 2015, Idaho considered reversing course and embracing open
access." Legislation introduced that year would have repealed the 1949 and 1993
laws and replaced them with an explicit dedication of statutory materials to the public
domain.so That provision, however, did not become law."' Idaho law today continues
82
to reflect a stance of maintaining a state monopoly over the state's legal text.
Mississippi is another state that has made a proprietary claim of ownership over
its laws. Mississippi statutory law includes a code section that, like Idaho's law,
provides for copyrights over its statutory code, annotations, notes, and indexes, to be
taken originally by publishers and then assigned to the state." Mississippi's statute
72

See, e.g., Tim Armstrong, Can States CopyrightTheir Statutes?, HARV. INFO/LAW (Apr. 16,2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180803122652/http://blogs.harvard.edullnfolaw/2008/04/16/can-statescopyright-their-statutes/ [https://perma.cc/7MP6-VQ8H] ("As a policy matter, allowing a state (or
anybody else) to monopolize publication and distribution of statutes is a terrible idea. It does nothing to
incentivize the creation of new expressive works and prevents improvements in the accessibility of public
domain materials.").
" See, e.g., id.
74 id.
75 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-210 (West 2018).
76 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws § 9-352 (repealed 2015). The statute was replaced by IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 74-123 (West 2018) with the same language.
7 Id.
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
7 H.B. 174, 63d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2015).
so Id. ("Idaho Code, including the statutes themselves, notes, annotations, indexing, and the
organizational and numbering scheme . . . shall be entirely in the public domain for purposes of federal
copyright law. No copyright in the Idaho Code shall be claimed by the state of Idaho or any other entity.").
81 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-210 (West 2018).
8 Id.
83 MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-1-9 (West 2018); see also Dmitrieva, supra note 4, at 118 (discussing the
example of Mississippi).
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additionally bears its teeth by providing for a civil fine of $1,000 per day for anyone
who "uses any part of any act passed by the Mississippi Legislature ... in any manner
other than as authorized by" ajoint committee of the Mississippi Legislature.' While
the fine would be preempted under federal copyright law,15 Mississippi apparently
means to signal its intent to enforce its claim, as the secretary of state's website
warns, "[T]he laws of Mississippi are copyrighted by the State of Mississippi. Users
are advised to contact the Joint Committee ... for information regarding publication
and distribution of the official Mississippi Code.""
But Mississippi's bark is not necessarily backed with a bite. Public.Resource.Org
scanned in a copy of the Mississippi Annotated Code-as it did with Georgia-and
thus managed in 2013 to provoke a cease and desist letter demanding removal of the
code." But as of 2018, the Mississippi Annotated Code remains available on
Public.Resource.Org's website. 8 The issue apparently has remained unlitigated.
That leaves the accessibility status of Mississippi's law in limbo, potentially keeping
alive the state's latent litigation threat. Unfortunately, that is likely to chill productive
uses of the code.89
Thus, in the present day, states using copyright to thwart open access to
state-owned legal materials remains an active, contested issue, one that is still very
much in flux. Having researched in this area, my perception is that there is a slow
trend toward more and more law being made publicly available, but that movement
seems to be driven by litigation and activist efforts, not by a shift in philosophy
among states legislators and officials toward valuing open access to the law. On
balance, it seems the impulse to restrict liberty with regard to the written law is as
alive as it has ever been. Moreover, there is enough of a variety in the forms of legal
texts (codes, statutes with annotations, quasi-official commentary, etc.) and enough
nuance in copyright law, that there is little likelihood any court decision in the
foreseeable future will cause states to give up hope of being able to leverage

8 Miss. CODE ANN. § 1-1-9 (West 2018).
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
*

Mississippi Law,

MIssissiPpi

SECRETARY

OF STATE,

http://www.sos.ms.gov/Education-

Publications/Pages/Mississippi-Code.aspx [https://perma.cc/B49Y-2XMQ]. The state's claim to
copyright over its statutory law is in contradistinction to its stance regarding the state constitution, which
"is published for free distribution." Id.
87 Letter from Larry A. Schemmel, Special Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Miss., to Carl Malamud,
Public.Resource.Org (Oct. 7, 2013), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/code/ms/ms.gov.20131007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DPE-S8HW]; see also Mike Masnick, Mississippi The Latest State To Claim Copyright
Over Official Compilation Of Its Laws, TECHDIRT (Oct. 14, 2013, 11:47 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131012/23510924854/mississipi-latest-state-to-claim-copyrightover-official-compilation-its-laws.shtml [https://perma.cc/J2HE-TTBX].
88 See, e.g., Official State Codes, Public.Research.Org (search for "Mississippi"),
https//archive.org/detais/govlaw?and[]-subject%3A%22mississippi.gov/`22 [https://permacc/CN9J-7NF2].
8 Along these lines, it should be noted that this and other state codes posted by Public.Resource.Org
remain difficult to use, as they exist as scanned-in images of book pages rather than easily searched text
files. Regarding chilling effects, see, for example,Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's
Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the FirstAmendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 196
(2010) ("[T]he architecture of law can be blamed for its effect on parties beyond the courtroom and the
four corners of a statute.").
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copyright to exert a proprietary claim over legal materials. That suggests it is
important to consider the issue from the perspective of the states-as this Article
endeavors to do-asking what their motivations are and should be.
In closing this section, I want to express that I am not trying to villainize
copyright-claiming states. In fact, some context is in order: It seems particularly hard
to paint these states as reprobates when what may be the most prominent learned
society of American lawyers and legal scholars-the American Law Institute
(ALI)-is itself an assiduous copyright claimant. Notwithstanding the ALI's
intellectual heritage in the work of David Dudley Field, the institute's renowned
Restatements of Law are held out of the public's reach. Electronic access to the ALI's
restatements is through proprietary databases HeinOnline, Westlaw, and Lexis,o and
print volumes are extremely pricey for a curious citizen." Although the American
Law Institute sees itself as "an institution founded and continued in a spirit of
92
voluntarism and commitment to the public good," it seems not to view public
93
access to the law as part of that mission.
Thus, state decisionmakers that choose closed-access for their legal materials
have some distinguished company.
D. Copyrightas the Means of ClosingAccess
There would be no controversy about public access to the law without copyright
or some similar legal entitlement for exercising exclusive control over textual
information. If everyone were unambiguously free to copy and redistribute all text,
then public access would be a fait accompli. But that is not the case since copyright
law creates a contestable basis for states and legal publishers to argue they have
monopoly rights over the state's written information about the law.
In the United States copyright law is federal statutory law94 enacted by Congress
pursuant to the authority of the Progress Clause." Copyright covers, among other
things, works of authorship consisting of written words that have requisite
" AM. LAW INST., ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2016-2017), httpsi//www.ali.org/media/filer_public/a5/bd/a5bdd2022c50-4549-a842-26095116e3b8/2016-2017_annual report web.pdf [https//permacdGMB3-FUVZ].
91 The three-volume Restatement of Contracts (Second) in print is $190.50. See Restatement of the Law
Secon4 Contracts,ALI, https://www.ali.org/publications/show/contracts/ [https-1/permacc/UVZ4-ZU7C].
92 AM. LAW INST., supra note 90, at 2 (quoting the Honorable Robert Shenton French).
93 The ALI states that its publishing activity is carried out for the purpose of raising revenue and for
ensuring their work is "disseminated to practicing lawyers, judges, academics, and students throughout

the world"-notably leaving the public off of that list. Id. at 20. Note, however, that the ALl has a website,
ALI Adviser, that provides some access to certain portions of restatement material: "One of the site's
exclusive features is public access to approved black letter on current projects. For example, during the

94th Annual Meeting, the Adviser regularly shared approved black letter with the public." Id. at 19. The
referenced website is THE ALI ADVISER, www.thealiadviser.org [https://perma.cc/7CPE-AH93].
" There are a few exceptions-although ones that are not important for purposes of the instant Article. See,
e.g., Deidrd A. Keller, LimitingLessonsfrom Property:Reimagining the Public Domain in the Image ofthe Public

TrustDoctrine, 107 KY. LJ. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing aspects of common-law copyright).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .").
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originality. 96
The first copyright statute was passed in 1790.9' It did not speak specifically to
the issue of whether primary sources of law could be copyrighted. As it turned out,
that issue was relevant to the very first copyright case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court-the 1834 case of Wheaton v. Peters." The case involved two battling
reporters of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Henry Wheaton and Richard
Peters, Jr." The Court's opinion made a number of key holdings, cementing the
case's role as foundational to much of U.S. copyright law." With specific regard to
the copyrightability of judicial opinions, the Wheaton opinion stated, albeit in dicta,
"the court are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright
in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot
confer on any reporter any such right."' 0 ' Despite the apparent strength of conviction
of this statement-or perhaps because of it-the U.S. Supreme Court cited no legal
authority nor did it provide any logic-based argument.1 02
After Wheaton, various lower courts held-also without much analysis or
citation to authority-that compiling statutes or opinions and adding notes and other
matter to them could make the resulting primary legal sources copyrightable.' 03
Eventually, Congress engaged with the question of whether government legal
works would be susceptible to copyright. A 1906 draft of what eventually became
the Copyright Act of 1909 would have excluded from copyrightability all "official
acts, proceedings, laws, or ordinances of public authorities-federal, state, or
municipal," as well as "judicial decisions" and "any government publication."'04
This provision was, however, strongly opposed by legal publishers of state judicial
opinions.' And the publishers' lobbying efforts prevailed-at least with regard to
works of state governments. The 1909 Act's explicit exclusion of government works
was in the end limited to those of the U.S. government. 06 But Professors L. Ray
Patterson and Craig Joyce report that the statute's omission to say anything about the
copyrightability of primary sources of state law was approved with the understanding

9 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists ...

in original works of authorship fixed in
.

any tangible medium of expression .... Works of authorship include . . . literary works. .
97 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).

9 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 598-99 (1834).
9 Patterson & Joyce, supra note 4, at 731.
1n Id. (referring to the case as the "cornerstone of American copyright law").
1'

Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 668.

102 Id.; see also Dmitrieva, supra note 4, at 84; Patterson & Joyce, supra note 4, at 734.
103

Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 8394) (holding that even though the text

of a New York Court of Appeals opinion is free of copyright, the state could claim protection for "notes
and references" and have a copyright over the volumes); Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61 (C.C.D. Minn.
1866) (holding that the state of Minnesota could not claim a copyright over its statutes, but could claim a
copyright over "marginal notes or references").
104 Patterson & Joyce, supra note 4, at 753 (quoting Draft of Feb. 28, 1906, reprinted in E.F.
BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT XXXII (1976)).
105,Id.

.o. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976) ("[N]o copyright shall subsist in
the original text of . .. any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint, in whole or in
part, thereof .... ).
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that it would leave undisturbed case law that had already held that the text ofjudicial
opinions was uncopyrightable and that it would leave further development of
copyright law in this area to the courts.'i 7
The contemporary incarnation of copyright law is the Copyright Act of 1976. It
carries over the 1909 Act's explicit denial of copyright over federal works.' And
similarly, it makes no provision for denying copyright to works of state or local
governments. 0 9
Thus, it is crystal clear that federally created legal materials are uncopyrightable,
including federal statutes and federal court opinions. But with Congress abstaining
from saying anything explicit about the copyrightability of state primary legal
authority, the door was left open for states to attempt to lay proprietary claims over
their law, strike exclusive-access deals with publishers, and wait for pushback in the
form of public-policy-type arguments." 0 Those are explored in the next section.
I. SOME IDEALISM: RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND AUTHORS

In this part, I will review two leading legal arguments-which are also abstract
policy arguments-for the proposition that states should not be able to encumber
access to the law with copyright claims: due process arguments and the publicownership theory.
A. Due Process IRule ofLaw
A cluster of arguments about due process and fundamental tenets of the rule of
law may be the most common and most straightforward rationale for opposing
copyright-exclusivity over state law. A starting concept is that of notice-the idea
that due process requires notice, or at least constructive notice, and that notice
requires open access to the law.
One older case in this vein, Banks & Bros. v. West Publishing Co., is worth a
particular look because it may be the earliest case to offer an in-depth rationale,
starting from an absence of precedent."' The case, heard in federal court, concerned
107 Patterson & Joyce, supra note 4, at 753-55 ("[T]he compromise that excluded state decisions and
statutes was not that they should have copyright protection, but that the issue should be left to the courts.
All of the participants in shaping this provision of the 1909 Act seem to have understood and agreed that
copyright for a publication containing government works was prohibited under existing case law.").
'0o 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1976). It is worth noting that this a front-and-center feature of U.S. copyright
law. The copyright code as created by the 1976 Act starts at Section 101. Patterson & Joyce, supra note
4, at 750 n.105. Thus, the provision exempting federal works from copyright's scope occurs early in the
code-even prior to delimiting infringement (§ 106) and laying out fair use (§ 107). 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-07
(1976). Regarding the relation of this provision to the 1909 Act, see Patterson & Joyce, supra note 4, at
752, for a discussion of how Section 105's federal-works prohibition is a carry-over from the 1909 Act.
109 Dmitrieva, supra note 4 at 82 (discussing copyrights in state primary legal materials and making
comparison with federal materials).
"0 Many of these public policy arguments would be prosecuted via the fair use doctrine. At any rate,
in my abbreviated discussion, I don't mean to speak of public policy to the exclusion of fair use.
". Banks & Bros. v. West Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50, 59 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886).
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alleged exclusive rights to the opinions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 112 The
federal court noted that a common-law property right or statute-based copyright in
the judicial opinions of the judges of the state court would necessarily include the
right to withhold publication.1 1 3 Yet, the federal court observed that recognizing such
a right to squelch publication would conflict with "a maxim of universal application
that every man is presumed to know the law." 11 4 The Banks & Bros. court reasoned
that "freedom of access to the laws, or the official interpretation of those laws" needs
to be "co-extensive with the sweep of the maxim."i1 s The court drew on an analogy
to Caligula-though it didn't reference the famously depraved emperor by
name-to explain that it was inconsistent under our system of government to expect
obedience to laws while frustrating the reading of them." 6
Perhaps the best exposition of the due-process/rule-of-law line of thinking was
the First Circuit's 1980 opinion in Building Officials & Code Administrators
International, Inc. ("BOCA") v. Code Technology, Inc., a case involving the
re-publication of ostensibly copyrighted building codes that had been enacted into
law in Massachusetts. 1 7 The BOCA court held that it is a requirement of due process
that people have notice of the law's mandates-giving them a meaningful choice to
avoid the negative consequences of not obeying it."I
That of course makes sense in theory. But there's a practical problem the BOCA
court appreciated: We are long past the days of Hammurabi where the whole law
could be expressed in 282 rules. Today's law is complicated and voluminous. Of
course not even licensed lawyers have it committed to mind."I This practical reality
is made to fit with the ideals of due process through the concept of constructive
notice. The BOCA court explained:
So long as the law is generally available for the public to examine, then
everyone may be considered to have constructive notice of it; any failure
to gain actual notice results from simple lack of diligence. But if access to
the law is limited, then the people will or may be unable to learn of its
requirements and may be thereby deprived of the notice to which due
11

2

Id. at 56-57.

"' Id. at 57.
" Id.
1s

id

"' Id ("The act of that emperor who caused his enactments to be written in small letters, on small
tablets, and then posted the latter at such height that none could read the letters, and at the same time
insisted upon the rule of obedience, outraging as it did the relations of governor and governed under his
own system of government, has never been deemed consistent with or possible under ours.").
17

Bldg. Officials & Code Adm'rs Int'l v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 731 (1st Cir. 1980)

[hereinafter BOCA]. While the Building Officials decision specifically concerned statutory text, other
cases have upheld the same principle with regard to judicial opinions. See, e.g., Banks v. Manchester, 128
U.S. 244, 253 (1888) ("The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and
interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a
declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.").
"8 BOCA, 628 F.2d at 734 ("Due process requires people to have notice of what the law requires of
them so that they may obey it and avoid its sanctions.").
"' A widely held expectation of lawyers is that they will know how to look up the law, rather than
have it committed to memory.
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20
process entitles them.1

Importantly, the BOCA court was not swayed by the argument that the building
code was made available to the public in an authorized way by its copyright
owners.' 2 ' As the BOCA court observed, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
include the right to halt all distribution and reproduction of a copyrighted work.1 22
The BOCA court thus pointed out that this power to shut off access has due process
implications. The court suggested this incident of copyright protection could not be
squared with the due process requirement that members of the public have the right
23
to examine the law to which they are subject.1
B. The People'sAuthorhood
The other principle rationale for the uncopyrightability of law combines notions
of democracy and property: Copyright cannot exclude the public from having the
right to reproduce and distribute the law because, in a democracy, the public is the
author and thus owner of the laws.1 24
This idea of citizen-ownership as a justification for denying copyright
exclusivities goes back at least to the Banks & Bros. case in 1886.125 Along with the
due process story, the citizen-ownership view was persuasive to the BOCA court,
which found the "metaphorical concept of citizen authorship" to be a common thread
woven through various prior cases.1 26 In BOCA, the First Circuit wrote, "The citizens
are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually drafts
the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of the public,
27
expressed through the democratic process."
In another modern building code case, Veeck v. Southern Building Code
CongressInternational,the Fifth Circuit relied upon the public-ownership theory in
allowing wholesale copying of building codes enacted into law, explaining:
Even when a governmental body consciously decides to enact proposed
model building codes, it does so based on various legislative
considerations, the sum of which produce its version of "the law." In
performing their function, the lawmakers represent the public will, and

BOCA, 628 F.2d at 734.
Id. at 734.
122 Id. at 734-35 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932)). In Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal,
the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "The owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending
120
121

or licensing and content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his

property."
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
123
BOCA, 628 F.2d at 735.
124 Id. at 734.
1"

Banks & Bros. v. West Publ'g Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886) ("Each citizen is a

ruler, -a law-maker-and as such has the right of access to the laws he joins in making and to any official
interpretation thereof.").
126

BOCA, 628 F.2d at 734.

127 id
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the public are the final "authors" of the law.1 2 8
A particularly ebullient expression of the public ownership theory can be found in
plaintiff-activist Peter Veeck's celebratory headline announcing his court victory. In bold
red font, his website asked, "Who Owns the Law?"1 29 And it provided the answer, in

bold: "YOU DO!"'30
The most forceful expression of the people's authorhood argument, and the most
intellectually probing, is probably the 2018 opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in the
Georgia case of Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org.131
Acknowledging BOCA and Veeck,1 3 2 but seeing additional factual complexity in
Georgia's copyright claim over elements of the OCGA that lacked the force of law,
the Code Revision court found that there was a need to embark on an examination of
"first principles."' It did so by citing to the Declaration of Independence, the
Federalist Papers, Marbury v. Madison, Tocqueville's Democracy in America, and
the Gettysburg Address.' 34 Delving into the operating system of the United States in
this way, the court determined that the OCGA annotations were uncopyrightable.1 35
Though lacking the force of law, the court found the creation, approval, and
publishing of the annotations in the OCGA to be "an exercise of sovereign power." 3 6
And since "the People, as the reservoir of all sovereignty, are the source of our law,"
the annotations were necessarily constructively authored by the people, making them
"intrinsically public domain material."'
To delimit the scope of the use that the public could make of the OCGA, the Code
Revision court leaned with favor on Veeck's analysis indicating that the public
authorhood doctrine protects a greater scope of defendant conduct than what might
meet minimum due-process standards:
We disagree that the question of public access can be limited to the
minimum availability that [the copyright-claimant building code
congress] would permit. . . . [The] concept of free access to the law [does
not require] a factual determination [nor is it] limited to due process, as
the term is understood today. Instead, public ownership of the law means
precisely that "the law" is in the "public domain" for whatever use the
citizens choose to make of it. Citizens may reproduce copies of the law
for many purposes, not only to guide their actions but to influence future
legislation, educate their neighborhood association, or simply to amuse. If
a citizen wanted to place an advertisement in a newspaper quoting the
Anna, Texas building code in order to indicate his dissatisfaction with its
128
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complexities, it would seem that he could do so.

38

In fact, the Code Revision court twice quoted Veeck's "simply to amuse"
language to underscore the sweep of the privilege springing from the people's role
as author.1 39

HI. SoME REALISM:

ECONOMICS AND PRACTICALITIES

'

Given the way prior cases have placed freedom to access legal texts as central to
due process and ideals of democratic sovereignty, why is it that states recurrently
seek arrangements that close public access to the law? To me, it is implausible that
legislators and state officials are motivated by a desire to undermine due process or
democracy. So, then, what is the motivation? To the extent it could be legally
permissible for a state to make proprietary claims over its legal information, why
would a state want to do so? Why would state legislators and officials not only want
to enter into exclusive deals that limit access to state legal information, but also put
in the time, effort, and expense of policing that exclusivity with litigation?
This Part speculates on answers to those questions and then offers responses. The
reason some speculation is necessary is that states rarely give reasons for why they
are pursuing a closed-access policy. For the most part, they just do. In this sense, the
Code Revision litigation is helpfully illuminating: It pushed one state, Georgia, to
commit to writing at least some reasons as to why it believes closed access makes
for good public policy.' It has to be acknowledged that briefs are written by lawyers
after the fact-thus they may not correspond well to the motivations of parties predating the litigation. What is more, briefs may reveal little about what motivates a
party to continue the fight onward to court and the appeals process. Nonetheless,
Georgia's brief offers clues, and I lean on it in conjecturing a state's motivations to
pursue a pay-for-access plan for state legal information.1 4
A.

The Default: Inertiaand the PaperLegacy

The starting place for conjecturing as to why states pursue closed-access
strategies is inertia. Today's state officials and legislators are dealing with a hand'" Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002).

"9 Code Revision, 906 F.3d at 1241, 1247 n.2.
14 See Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of& for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly
of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 18-19.
14 1
The appellate brief at the Eleventh Circuit provides reasons as to why Georgia would consider it

good public policy to pursue its closed-access/proprietary model of distributing official legal information.
See id. at 17-19. The district court brief for summary judgment says little in the public policy vein and
adds nothing of substance over the appellate brief. The brief in the district court does argue that Georgia's
choice keeps prices low. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment at 4-5, Code Revision Comm'n er rel. Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, 244. F. Supp. 3d
1350 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (No. 1:15-CV-02594-MHC). But the appellate brief contains the same argument
stated the same way. Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of& for the Benefit of the Gen.
Assembly of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 19.
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me-down system for memorializing, storing, and disseminating legal materials. And
while today it is easy to put documents on the web and instantly make them available
to everyone everywhere, state governments are working with an ever-lengthening
line of judicial and legislative output that goes back a century or more. That means
all states were previously forced to deal with a paper-based system of books for
statutes and cases-and all the cumbersomeness and expense that came along with
that. Dealing with for-profit publishers as a means of getting that work done-and
getting it done consistently and competently-was no doubt a very practical choice.
Idaho presents a good example of how today's state legal information structure
is a carryover from the book era. Idaho's 1949 code section concerning copyright
over Idaho's compiled statutes 142 is part of a stretch of related provisions inextricably
bound up with a paper-based reality. The 1949 code section has requirements phrased
with reference to "size of type to be used,"'1 43 pocket parts,"'" and "grade and
weight of paper." 1 45 There is an explicit provision in the law for seventy-five sets to
be maintained for the use of legislators.1 46 And revealing anxieties about books
walking off, there is a prohibition on selling the compilations coupled with an
exception that allows book-for-book exchanges with libraries of other states and
territories.1 47

Idaho's legal-research architecture, of course, makes sense only in a pure-paper
world. And once you put yourself in those shoes, it is hard not to sympathize with
those in the Idaho capitol who saw the need to partner with an experienced legal
publishing company-one that happened to use copyright as a key foundation of its
business model-to make sure it all got done.
With all that machinery in motion, having worked well enough for decades, it is
predicable that when digital technologies come along state governments would be
receptive to the offers from their well-worn publishing vendors to make the digital
transition. Under such circumstances, it takes forceful volition to move to
open-access. State governments, of course, already have their hands full with the
normal business of governing. Combine that with an absence of organized,
politically savvy interest groups to make the case for open access and it is hardly
surprising that so many states today have wound up preserving a middleman's role
for the for-profit legal publishers.
Thus, a copyright-based closed-access legal materials regime is the default. What
is important now is that states recognize it as such-something arrived at by
historical accident, built around the needs of an antiquated business model rather
than democratic and liberty-based ideals of public access. Thus, in the next section,
I talk about what states might plausibly see as the upside of closed access other than
the convenience of avoiding change.

142 IDAHO CODE ANN.

Id. § 73-205.
' Id. § 73-201.
143

141
146
47

1

Id. § 73-205.
Id.
Id.

§ 73-212.
§ 73-211.

§ 73-210

(West 2018).
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B. About the Upside: A PerceptionofPrivatelyProvided Value
As mentioned, the Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org litigation
provides a window into rationales a state can articulate for maintaining a
closed-access system for state-owned legal materials. Featured among those
rationales is the notion that contracts between states and traditional legal publishers
constitute public-private partnerships' 48 -and thus a favored way of providing
government services-and that the resulting proprietary system entails delivering
legal information at a lower cost to the public.149 Additionally, copyright-based
arrangements with traditional publishers are endorsed as making legal materials
available to users for low prices and providing limited web-based access for free.'
I discuss those rationales in this section.
i. Public-Private Partnerships and Low Costs
States may champion a copyright-based arrangement with a traditional legal
publisher as a "public-private partnership" that delivers a public good at a low cost.
1
The definition of public-private partnership is contested in the literature, ' but the
phrase roughly means a deal between a government and a private firm to arrange for
the providing of a public service. 5 2 As a way of providing public goods,
public-private partnerships have a long history. An agreement between government
and a for-profit firm for the provision of a public service appears to go back at least
to the 1400s when Luis de Bernam, a nobleman from France, won the right to charge
fees for the transportation of cargo on the Rhine River.'
There are plausible theoretical reasons why the sorts of structures that fit under
the banner of public-private partnerships can be beneficial for the public-such as
by gaining efficiencies through access to expertise and financing.1 54 But critics warn
that the incantation of public-private partnerships can also be part of a "language
148 Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly

of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 17 ("THE STATE'S PURPOSE IN PUBLISHING THE
OCGA AND USING A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO DO SO WAS FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THE CITIZENS OF GEORGIA").
149 See, e.g., id. at 18-19.
"s See, e.g., id. at 19.
`5 See Swapnil Garg & Sachin Garg, Rethinking Public-private Partnerships: An Unbundling

Approach, 25 TRANSP. REs. PROCEDIA 3789, 3790 (2017) (identifying the public-private partnership as a
"contested concept").
112 Id. at 3793-94.
13 Id. at 3791. Another early example is from the 1600s, when Britain awarded the East India
Company rights of exploration and exploitation of Asia in return for a share of what the company took
away. Id.
15 See, e.g., Jens K. Roehrich, Michael A. Lewis, & Gerard George, Are Public-PrivatePartnerships

a Healthy Option? A Systematic Literature Review, 113 Soc. SCI. & MED. 110, 113 (2014) ("The
often-stated policy aim ofPPPs, part ofthe New Public Management logic, is to achieve higher efficiency
by bundling investments, infrastructure and service delivery in order to draw on expertise and sometimes
financial resources . . . ." (citations omitted)).
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game" that masks the "the encouragement of private providers to supply public
services at the expense of public organisations."Iss One commentator-arguing in
favor of privatization--observed that terms such as "privatization" and "contracting
out" engender negative reactions, while "alternative delivery systems" and
"public-private partnership" can help foster acceptance. 5 6
In recent decades, public-private partnerships have soared in trendiness.i" In
1982, when the Georgia legislature decided to create the OCGA and to make a deal
with a private firm to publish it,' t "public-private partnership" was surging as a
popular term."' And while there once was pushback about whether public-private
partnerships were a wise choice for policymakers, today it seems political opposition
has largely vanished and the desirability of public-private partnerships has become
orthodoxy.1 6 0

A common fallacy with regard to public-private partnerships is that, as a general
characteristic, they lower costs. Georgia's appeals court brief exemplifies this. The
state argued that its deal with Lexis was "a low cost method" for producing an
annotated code and that the deal ensured that Lexis "bears the costs of publication in
exchange for the exclusive right to sell the [code] and the right to a share of the
profits from those sales."i' Further on in its brief, the state contrasted the current
state of affairs with a model of unrestricted access, which would require, the state
claimed, that "the State[] and its tax payers ... bear the entire cost of the OCGA
publication."' 62
Yet the idea that public-private partnerships transfer costs away from taxpayers
is mistaken.
First, as a matter of basic economics, this sort of rationale is premised on a
confusion about the idea of cost. Cost describes the amount of resources devoted to
something.' 63 It is distinct from what any one party pays. This is not a matter of mere
55 Nilufa Akhter Khanom, Conceptual Issues in Defining Public Private Partnerships(PPPs), 6

INT'L REv. Bus. RES. PAPERS 150, 154 (2010).
156 See id.; see also Carsten Greve, Public-PrivatePartnershipsin Scandinavia, 4
INT'L PUB. MGMT.
REv., no. 2, 2003, at 59, 60.
1s7 See Ryan Holeywell, Public-Private PartnershipsAre Popular, But Are They Practical?,
GOVERNING (Nov. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infi-astructure/gov-publicprivate-popular.html [https://perma.ce/N33M-UVEB] (describing public-private partnerships as "all the
buzz" and, in sub-headline, as "trendy").
'" Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly
of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 17-19.
59
' See Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams [https://perma.cc/GGU42H7G] (type in "private-partner partnership" into the text box; then type in "2008" as the final date; then
click "search lots of books").
'6 See Holeywell, supra note 157 ("Increasingly, it seems the discussion of [public-private
partnerships] isn't about whether it's wise for governments to enter the deals; it's about how governments
can best facilitate them.").
161 Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly
of Ga.,
62 & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 19.
1 Id. at 20.
163 See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment
Principles
for Converging CommunicationsMedia, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1730 & n.61 (1995) (speaking in the context
of broadcast communications policy, "[e]conomic costs are the costs (including opportunity costs) of
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semantics-it is substantive. For instance, in the case of Georgia's code, the cost of
the OCGA is the amount of resources poured into creating the code by the State of
Georgia and by Lexis (represented largely by salary dollars for state and Lexis
employees), plus the additional costs borne by users in having to endure the more
cumbersome access necessitated by the paywall, and so forth." Lexis is not a
charity, of course, so assuming this deal is working as Lexis intended and is operating
in the black, all of Lexis's costs not borne by the state are passed on to subscribers,
licensees, and purchasers of physical copies.
This constancy of cost is a general feature of public-private partnerships. They
do not magically create "free money"-despite having that perception among
many.' 65 As one commentator said in the context of public-private partnerships for
providing transportation infrastructure, "[C]itizens ultimately pay for the project,
either through tax dollars or tolls."'6
While tolls-whether for driving on a road or accessing a legal database-do not
function to lower the cost of a government service to taxpayers, they can and do
concentrate the financial burden on certain taxpayers. This can be a genuine policy
choice, and it is often an intentional part of the design of transportation
infrastructure.167 Creating a new toll-based expressway to avoid congestion on
existing roads ends up benefiting those persons who both find the road useful and
who can afford to pay for the privilege of getting where they are going faster.
Concomitantly, such a toll-based system places the lion's share of the financial
burden with those persons. Individuals that could productively use the expressway
but who can't afford it are not entirely out of luck. Such persons have the option of
taking the surface streets or sitting in stop-and-go traffic on clogged freeways-still
getting where they are going, albeit more slowly. What is important to understand is
that such a policy choice is not about lowering costs, it is about shifting the burden
among taxpayers. Also, it bears pointing out that such a policy choice involves one
set of concerns when it comes to access to faster roads, but a different and probably
more urgent set of concerns when it comes to accessing the law-a task that goes to
the core character of our democratic society.
resources employed in communicating, not necessarily the prices charged by (perhaps monopolistic)
owners of those resources").
'" See Decl. of Clay Johnson at 5-8, submitted as Ex. K with Defendant Public.Resource.Org, Inc.'s
Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2 (regarding the
cumbersomeness of the Lexis-maintained website for free access to statutory text); Krattemnaker & Powe,
supra note 163, at 1730 & n.61 (regarding opportunity costs).
65
' See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-44, HIGHWAY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:
MORE RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS COULD BETTER SECURE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND PROTECT THE

PUBLIC INTEREST 72 (2008) [hereinafter GAO-08-44], https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0844.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3C9-KP6T] ("There is no 'free' money in highway public-private partnerships"). See
also Holeywell, supra note 157 (quoting Robert Puentes of the Brookings Institution regarding the
perception of "free money"). See also id. (quoting Joshua Schank, head of a transportation think tank, that

misperceptions about public-private partnerships are "fueled by. . . 'public officials who want to escape
the reality that if they want better infrastructure, somebody's got to pay for it, and that somebody's got to
be taxpayers').
'" Holeywell, supra note 157.
'" See GAO-08-44, supra note 165 at 25.
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All that being said, it is in fact possible that a particular mode of producing or
distributing something-goods, services, or legal information--can work out as
having a lower cost. To truly involve a lower cost, however, one means of production
or distribution must somehow be more efficient than another. In this way, a
public-private partnership might indeed offer a lower cost than direct government
provision of services. On the other hand, direct provision of public services might
work out to be more efficient. Whether one or the other is more efficient will depend
on the particularities of any given situation.
Efficiencies leading to lower costs for public-private partnerships are decidedly
plausible in the transportation context. A report by the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) found that roadway public-private partnerships can potentially lower
the total costs of a project by, for instance, disciplining the decision-making process
to more efficiently use resources. 1 6 Yet the same report warns such efficiencies "are
not assured and can be achieved only through careful, comprehensive analysis to
determine whether public-private partnerships are appropriate in specific
circumstances and, if so, how best to structure them." 16 9
So while it is possible that an arrangement like the Lexis/Georgia deal is more
economically efficient and thus truly lower-cost, such a case would have to be
carefully made. And with regard to the Lexis/Georgia deal, such a case was not made,
either in Georgia's appellate briefing or, apparently, anywhere else.o Meanwhile,
the reverse could be true: There are several plausible reasons why the Lexis/Georgia
deal could increase costs. In fact, the most straightforward thing one might expect is
that the Lexis deal would increase costs by way of rent-seeking, as monopolies tend
to do in the absence of vibrant competition in a free market."' With regard to toll
roads, the GAO has observed that public-private partnerships have the strong
potential to increase costs:
[I]t is likely that tolls on a privately operated highway will increase to a
greater extent than they would on a publicly operated toll road. There is
also the risk of tolls being set that exceed the costs of the facility, including
a reasonable rate of return, should a private concessionaire gain market
power because of the lack of viable travel alternatives.1 72
There are other cost considerations that have to be taken into account as well.
Various supervisory tasks remain with the government and are necessarily borne by
the public treasury. That is to say that governments using public-private partnerships
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
170 Cf Cate Long, DealBook's QuestionableArgument on Privatization, REUTERS: MUNILAND
(July
15, 2013, 10:36 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2013/07/15/dealbooks-questionable-argumenton-privatization/ [https://perma.cc/EV55-SG3T] ("Whenever I see advocacy like [transactional attorney
and public-private partnership advocate Kent] Rowey's, I look for real economic analysis that justifies
privatization. It's never there."); see also Holeywell, supranote 157 (quoting the same).
171 See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Propertyand the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
623, 665 (2012) (discussing rent seeking).
172 See GAO-08-44, supra note 165, at "highlights"
page.
16

169
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must also factor in the costs of supervising their private partner.1
In contemplating whether exclusive-rights deals with traditional legal publishers
should be looked on favorably as a species of public-private partnership, it also bears
keeping in mind that there is a history of governments entering public-private
partnerships that seemed like good deals at the time, only to later be revealed as
deeply problematic. Some deals might even be characterized as giveaways to private
firms. 7 41in one notorious example, the City of Chicago leased 36,000 metered
parking spaces for a term of seventy-five years to an investor group in return for an
upfront $1.1 billion.' 7 1 Certainly that seems like a lot of money. But a later report by
the city inspector general found that the city undervalued the deal by nearly
$1 billion.1 76 That view seems bolstered by the investor group's own note-issuance
document, which predicts taking in a minimum of $11.6 billion from Chicago
motorists over the lease term-resulting in a profit of $9.58 billion before taxes,
interest, and depreciation."' Thus, the Chicago parking meter lease, once the true
7
economics were known, turned out to be an "egregious municipal scaml]." 1
A public-private partnership doesn't have to amount to a giveaway to end up
being regrettable. One concern is that the contract underlying a public-private
partnership can deprive a government of the policymaking flexibility it may need in
the future. A well-known example is the Route 91 toll road in Orange County,

California, created out of a public-private partnership in the early 1990s.179 The State

of California entered a public-private partnership for the creation and operation of
the toll roadis-ostensibly offloading risk, increasing flexibility, and adding
capacity that would reduce congestion. Problems surfaced some years later,
however, when California realized it needed to add capacity to the route to relieve
further congestion and decrease accident rates.' 8 1 Unfortunately for the state, it was
confronted with a non-compete provision in its original deal that prohibited
additional capacity within a one-and-a-half-mile zone along the path of the toll
'73
See Gownment Objecties: Benefer and Risks of PPPs, WORLD BANK GROUP,
https//ppp.woldbank.org/public-pvate-partnership/overview/pppbjectives [https//permacc/7DYU-778D].

See, e.g., Holeywell, supra note 157.
175 See Brian Eckhouse, Amanda Albright, & Martin Z Braun, Public-PrivatePartnerships,BLOOMBERG:
QUICKTAKE (Oct. 16,2018, 10,55 AM EDT), https//www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/public-private-partnerships.
176 Id.
17 See Darrell Preston, Morgan Stanley Group's $11 Billion Makes Chicago Taxpayers Cry,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2010, 12:01 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-0809/morgan-stanley-group-s-Il -billion-from-chicago-meters-makes-taxpayers-cry.
17' Long, supra note 170. Note that within the range of structures that could be called public-private
partnerships, the Chicago parking meters lease functions largely like a secured debt transaction. See Julie
A. Roin, Privatizationand the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1965, 1968 (2011) ("Rather than
true privatization transactions, it is more accurate to describe these deals as loans repayable out of future
governmental revenues." (footnote omitted)).
'" See generally Marion G. Boarnet & Joseph F. Dimento, The Private Sector's Role in Highway
Finance: Lessons from SR 91, 25 UC BERKELEY ACCESS MAG., no. 1, Fall 2004,
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt9q69608s/qt9q69608s.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q393WQA2].
'o Id. at 27.
181 Id. at 28-29.
17
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road.18 2 To add the capacity that Southern California drivers needed, the government
ended up buying its way out of the deal,' 83 paying $207.5 million for a $130 million
project.'18 4

So public-private partnerships can go spectacularly wrong. But even if a
public-private partnership is a sensible proposition economically, there are concerns
a government ought to have about preserving values of democratic participation
when an essential government service is involved. As Professor Celeste Pagano has
observed in the transportation context, private partners do more than just provide
financial muscle and business acumen, they also play a governance-like role in that
they "become responsible for providing an essential governmental service that will
affect the greater community."' And if that is cause for concern with roads, it is all
the more important when it comes to access to legal information. Pagano has argued
that to uphold democratic values in making decisions about entering such private
arrangements in the toll-road context, "affected parties should have meaningful
access to information about the proposal" and this should "include the ability of the
public to review facts about privatization proposals, bids, and contracts.""' That is
clearly something that needs to be thought about in exclusive-rights deals with legal
publishers. Notably, with the Georgia/Lexis deal, key aspects of the arrangements
have not been revealed publicly-even in the course of litigation."'
ii. Low Prices
Moving beyond the issue of low costs and public-private partnerships, another
argument made by Georgia in support of its closed-access model is that the OCGA
is available for a low price."' Note that the low-price argument is distinct from the
low-cost argument. While the low-cost argument is about the allegedly lessened
burden on taxpayers, the low-price argument is concerned with the price paid by
persons to get access to the OCGA. In particular, Georgia has heralded the fact that
the OCGA is available for just $404 for a complete set of printed volumes.' 8 9
In some ways, this is a difficult argument to grapple with, because "low price" 9 0
is a vague term. Insofar as brass-tacks economic analysis goes, "low price" is
182

Id. at 29.
'" See id. at 29.
* Holeywell, supra note 157.
18 Celeste Pagano, Proceed with Caution: Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road Privatizations, 83 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 351, 375 (2009).
'" Id. at 375-76.
i8 For example, the full contractual arrangements were not revealed in the motion papers. See, e.g.,
Agreement for Publication dated Dec. 27, 2006 between Code Revision Commission and Matthew Bender
& Co. at 20, submitted as Ex. F with Defendant Public.Resource.Org, Inc.'s Memorandum, supra note 2
(referencing in section 5.1 an incorporated Exhibit D with pricing information, but which is not included
in the litigation exhibit).
..
8 Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly
of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 4653, at 19.
1 Id (referring to the price in 2016).
'9' The brief speaks of a "price" that is "low." See id
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probably meaningless when used in an absolute sense. But let's suppose that "low
price" means a price that a buyer would brush off as being relatively insignificant in
making a decision about whether to purchase something. This seems to be what
Georgia meant. So, is $404 a low price? It is low only if you presuppose a certain
consumer. For instance, such a price might be low for a full-time legal professional
in Georgia. Yet $404 is extremely high for an out-of-state attorney only
intermittently and infrequently interested in Georgia law. It is higher still for a
curiosity seeker whose fleeting interest in seeing the OCGA was piqued by a
newspaper article.
Even supposing a given price is a "low price" in the abstract for a given
consumer, it is hard to know how much of the price is artificially boosted by the
publisher's monopoly, since monopolies have the ability to charge prices far in
excess of the cost of production."' That may be less of a problem in Georgia's
specific situation-at least with regard to the print edition-since part of its deal with
Lexis is that the state exercises control over the price.19 2 In this vein, Georgia has
said that its contractual right to keep the price low was an important consideration
for entering into the Lexis contract.' But print editions are less and less important
all the time. Certainly as a general matter, when it comes to copyright-based means
of publishing state law, the concept of low prices must be carefully scrutinized.
iii. Lower-Tier Free Access
Another perceived upside of state deals with traditional legal publishers is that
they commonly include a provision for a lower-tier of free online access. The
Georgia deal, in particular, requires Lexis to provide the unannotated text on a public
website for free.' 94 This is a contractual requirement that Lexis fulfilled on a
bare-bones basis.
As the World Bank has warned about public-private partnerships in general, the
"[p]rivate sector will do what it is paid to do and no more than that."' That describes
what Lexis did with its free-access website. To say that the site lacked userfriendliness would be a serious understatement. I can personally attest, as someone
who has tried to use Lexis's free websites in the past and who also can access to the
subscription version of Lexis, that moving from a free state-law Lexis website to the
subscription-based Lexis feels like finally being allowed out of the cupboard under
the stairs. Some of the lugubrious qualities of the free site were memorialized in the
papers filed in the Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Orglitigation:
blank screens when viewed with certain browsers, intermittent security alerts, a
"' See, e.g., Patterson & Joyce, supra note 4, at 734 (noting that after the Wheaton decision,
entrepreneurs rushed to begin publishing reports of cases that had previously been difficult to access

because of artificially high monopoly pricing).
192 Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
'9 Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comn'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen. Assembly
of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 4.
194

Code Revision, 906 F.3d at 1234.

195 Government Objectives: Benefits and Risks ofPPPs,supra note 173.
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search function that defaults to searching only the words in the table of contents
rather than the text of the statutes, an inability to bookmark or directly come back to
pages within the website, a claimed prohibition on the use of the data on the website
by "public non-profit users," and a requirement, as part of the terms and conditions
all users are required to click through, that users submit to the personal jurisdiction
of the New York courtS. 196

Things seem to have changed somewhat. Having recently checked in with
Lexis's public-access website, I found it greatly improved, with most of the problems
listed above apparently taken care of. It seems plausible that the visibility of the issue
occasioned by the pending appeal in the Code Revision litigation may have been an
encouragement to Lexis to spruce things up.
The more important point is that even if Lexis does provide a user-friendly
website, that does not mean that Georgia taxpayers are getting something of value
that they could not get otherwise. If bulk data is made available free of copyright
restrictions, public-minded do-gooders and tech-savvy entrepreneurs can
and will figure out how to package it for productive use. In essence, Google's
multi-billion-dollar success has largely been about its ability to take publicly
available data and make it more searchable and usable. And the entire Federal
Register is now easily searchable for free online because of the federal government's
decision to make the unprocessed bulk data available to the public and the subsequent
actions of three programmers who then used that data as the basis for an entry in an
"Apps for America" contest.197
C About the Downside:A Belief the Harn's Theoretical
The discussion to this point has covered how the history of paper-based legal
information systems made copyright claims a default choice for states and how
perceived benefits of public-private partnerships and lower costs have led to a
perception of an upside in sticking with closed access. This section concerns the
perceived downside.
For state legislators and officials to forge ahead with copyright-based proprietary
claims that limit access to state legal information, there must be a perception that the
downside is minimal or at least outweighed by the upside. My guess is that state
legislators and officials view the issue of limitation on access to be a trivial one for
citizens left on the other side of the paywall. That is, if legislators and officials agree
that citizens must be accorded access to the law that governs them,198 then those state

1'

See Decl. of Clay Johnson at 5-8, submitted as Ex. K with Defendant Public.Resource.Org, Inc.'s

Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2; see also Plaintiff's
Responses to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment at 24-26, Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, 244. F. Supp. 3d 1350
(N.D. Ga. 2017) (No. 1:15-CV-02594-MHC).
197

See Decl. of Beth Simone Noveck at 4-6, submitted as Ex. C with Defendant Public.Resource.Org,
Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, supranote 2.
' See, e.g., Brief of Appellee Code Revision Comm'n on Behalf of & for the Benefit of the Gen.
Assembly of Ga., & the State of Ga., supra note 46, at 18 ("Accordingly, the State was not required to
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decision-makers must see the limitations on access that result from exclusive
publisher deals to be substantively unimportant. The concerns of open-access
proponents, in the views of such officials and lawmakers, must be mostly theoretical,
having little or no real-world importance.
If that is the case, then in an era of tight budgets and frustrated taxpayers, it
shouldn't be a surprise that fiscal concerns tip the balance in favor of a closed system.
What is more, if the due-process/democratic concerns are merely a theoretical
problem, then it makes sense that state actors would think a theoretical solution is
sufficient. They might reason that as long as there is some way for citizens to get
access-such as by making a trip to a library or office somewhere' 9 9-then it doesn't
matter that such access is cumbersome to the point of deterring all but the most
doggedly persistent.
Let's take the due-process/rule-of-law concerns and unpack them the way a state
official might. We start with the aphorism ignorance of the law is no excuse.20o The
straightforward rationale for this is that if ignorance were an excuse, there would be
an incentive to avoid learning the law so as to avoid the obligation to obey it.20' That
would lead to an absurd outcome. Thus, our system of law and government rejects
excuses based on willful ignorance, putting the onus on citizens to learn the law or
risk being surprised when its sanctions are applied. Yet if citizens are not able to
access the law, their ignorance cannot be seen as willful. In such a circumstance, a
lack of access means we must either jettison due-process/rule-of-law/fundamental
-fairness norms, or, if we are committed to those norms, we must excuse persons'
noncompliance with the law so long as they can plead ignorance-a choice that
would invite lawlessness.
When you put the argument this way, it's easy to imagine how a well-meaning
legislator or state official would respond: This is, one might say, a contrived thought
experiment that does not reflect everyday reality. People do not, for instance, need
access to statutes or judicial opinions to know that murder is against the law. It's
common knowledge. And not having access to statutes or judicial opinions cannot
cause people to be ignorant of speed limits or intersections where stopping is
required. Speed limit signs and stops signs ensure public access to those mandates
of the law.
But, of course, laws change. Suppose a new law is passed. How can the justice
system fairly expect citizens to know about a law that didn't exist previously? If it is
an everyday sort of law-one that is a practical constraint on the actions of regular
people-then, realistically, citizens will find out about it without looking through
law books. A new law prohibiting cell phone usage while driving in a school zone,

issue an official codification of its laws, but did so in an effort to better inform its citizens.").
'"See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
supranote 141, at 7 (reciting that there are sixty places in Georgia, including libraries and law enforcement
offices, where citizens are allowed to access the OCGA on a CD-ROM).
200 See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910) ("[I]nnocence cannot be asserted
of an action which violates existing law, and ignorance of the law will not excuse.").
201 See, e.g., People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 P. 45, 47 (Cal. 1892) ("If a person accused of
crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he violated, immunity
from punishment would in most cases result ... The plea would be universally made .... ).
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for instance, would be accompanied by a flurry of news reports. Temporary signage
near schools and a billboard campaign would get the word out as well.
Word-of-mouth would take over from there. In later years, the message about what
the law requires would be perpetuated through driver's education courses and parents
teaching their kids to drive. Access to law books would be superfluous in such a case.
In other words, it seems fair to assume that the everyday law-the law ordinary
citizens need to know to navigate society on a day-to-day basis-is already
accessible to the public because it diffuses into common knowledge.
What is really at stake when we talk about copyright claims over primary source
legal materials, a state legislator or official might reason, is citizen access to obscure
law that few people need to understand. Such not-everyday law would include the
law needed by a business registering as an LLC, a litigant filing a summary judgment
motion, or a wealthy person doing estate planning-and so forth. This not-everyday
law, one might think, was never going to be used by everyday citizens except under
special circumstances in which they would be hiring an attomey-and it is
reasonable to expect those attorneys to pay for access. And for professionals or firms
that need recurring access to a particular body of law relevant to their
business-building contractors, pharmacists, or accountants, for instancehen it
would seem to be not too much to expect for those people and firms to pay for access
as part of their cost of doing business.
We know that this line of common-sense argument is plausible: Everyday
citizens have not had ready access to the OCGA for decades, yet the sky hasn't fallen
in Georgia.
Now let's keep putting ourselves in the position of a state legislator or official
and work out a further what-if. What if citizens could access the non-everyday law
for free? To make the question more concrete: What if there were unrestricted
reproduction of and access to the OCGA for free? In such a case, of course, nearly
all citizens would leave it unread. A scattered few would read portions of it. Some
people would look into bits and pieces of it to satisfy idle curiosity. If they lacked
legally training, such people might not understand it. Worse, such people might
misunderstand what they read. Some non-legally trained bloggers would no doubt
access legal texts and make some unnuanced or flatly mistaken observations. Let's
label these as "dilettante users," and let's stipulate that they will be few and sporadic.
Who will be the non-dilettante users? That is, who will make widespread,
systematic, constructive use of the OCGA if it is offered for free? The answer would
seem to be clear: lawyers, businesses, and various professionals. And these nondilettante users would, one could readily reason, be precisely the people who would
have paid to access the law had they been required to do so.
Thus from this line of reasoning one could conclude that doing away with
copyright claims over the law will not make the law newly accessible to anyone in
any meaningful way; instead, it will allow some to take a "free ride." In other words,
a common-sense-motivated state legislator or official could plausibly assume that
allowing unfettered reproduction and distribution of a state-owned legal source like
the OCGA will not, in any meaningful, real-world sense, make a difference in the
accessibility of the law. Instead, a lack of payment for access will mean that these
professionals and businesses will do what they were going to do anyway, but they
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won't be funding it themselves-they will be sticking taxpayers with the bill.
So what is wrong with this argument?
i. Democratic/Due-Process Hygiene
The first response is that the state ought to allow dilettante users to have full
access to the law of their state-even if they don't make "good" use of it-because
doing so is a matter of good democratic hygiene.202
Society must practice democratic/due-process habits even when they are
superfluous so that they will be strong when they are truly needed. We already
understand this with regard to freedom of speech: We scrupulously uphold the right
of silly people to say silly things that cannot reasonably be characterized as adding
anything of value to the marketplace of ideas-that the international space station is
causing earthquakes, for instance. We do this so that free speech is strong when
society really needs it. For the same reasons, we ought to have an unwavering
commitment to keeping the state's legal information fully open and accessible.
ii. Lost Deals
The second response is that the above common-sense line of argument makes
bad assumptions. It is not a defensible assumption that all or nearly all
constructive/non-dilettante users would pay for access. State legislators and officials
should consider that there are many plausible users of state legal texts who are neither
in-state law firms, nor amateur bloggers. Let's call these users "in-between users."
One such group of in-between users is in-house counsel. Many companies may
not have subscription access for their in-house attorneys.2 03 But that does not mean
that in-house attorneys would not make productive use of access to legal materials if
they were there. Being able to read up on the law could help in-house counsel better
document their deals and avoid uncertainty in transactions, and to the extent those
effects exist, open access to the law would add to economic growth and efficiency.
Also consider out-of-state in-house attorneys. We can suppose such persons will
have enough familiarity with the law in their own state to be comfortable doing
routine transactions with in-state businesses. But suppose a company is considering
doing business with a firm in a state without open-access to official state legal
information. The out-of-state in-house counsel might want to do some quick legal
research about the other state's law before entering into a contract. Many such
nascent contracts will be small enough in terms of dollar value that it would not make
sense to hire an outside law firm or to obtain a Westlaw or Lexis subscription.2 04 In

&

202 Cf Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J. L.
PUB. POL'Y 203, 273-74 (2004) (discussing democracy-based rationales for transparency in
administrative agency work).
203 This can be expected where in-house attorneys tend to do routine work-in a field in which they
already know the applicable law while outside law firms are hired for outside-the-normal-course
litigation and non-recurring transactional work. See Michael J. Morse, Partneringwith In-House Counsel,

GPSOLO, July-Aug. 2004, at 38, 40.

204 See infra note 208 and accompanying text for a discussion of database subscription prices.
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such cases, lack of access to the other state's law creates friction-transaction costs,
to use the economists' term-that can deter firms from doing business with firms in
a closed-access state. Certainly it must be the case that, at the margins, deals have
been lost in Georgia and other states because of hurdles encountered when trying to
access the law.
How many deals are lost and how large is the economic impact from lack of ready
access in such situations? That is impossible to say without speculation or an
expensive empirical investigation. But barring that, we know that increased
transaction costs from legal uncertainty are a serious concern as a matter of economic
theory-in fact, transaction costs have been one of the driving preoccupations of the
law-and-economics movement.205 And in the absence of hard empirical data, it is
prudent to err on the side of lowering transaction costs. This is particularly so when
you consider the diminutive fiscal scale of deals between states and publishers. As a
concrete example, consider that Georgia has received about $85,000 a year in
revenues from its Lexis deal.206 Just a few lost business opportunities could swamp
whatever gains might be attributed to such a publishing deal. And if the marginal
legal uncertainty caused by Georgia's limitations on access to legal information is
significant with regard to even a tiny fraction of a percentage of total business
activity, then the economic loss could be quite large in dollar value, considering that
the state of Georgia's annual GDP contribution is more than a half a trillion
dollars.20 7
iii. Lost Influence and Innovation
Another problem with the above-outlined common-sense argument is that it does
not consider the ways in which in-between users of free legal information can help a
state to have increased influence beyond its borders.
205 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (seminal article
laying the groundwork for showing the importance of transaction costs in choosing among legal rules);
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38
STAN. L. REV. 623, 686 (1986) (describing how social-norms-based systems can offer lower transaction
costs compared to formal law among farmers and ranchers in a rural region of California); Yochai Benkler,
Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic
Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 277 (2004) (exploring how sharing may lower transaction costs compared
to market-based exchanges by importing relevant information and providing more motivation for clearing
excess capacity in certain kinds of goods).
206 See Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 18 ("[T]he Commission received $85,747.91 in
licensing fee royalties" in 2014). This may give us some rough measure of the amount of money at stake
for Georgia. Receipts from Lexis, of course, can't tell the whole story. A full balance sheet must include
money Georgia saved by not having state employees do work on the OCGA that was done by Lexis, plus
the expenses incurred in supervising the work done by Lexis. Nonetheless, the $85,000 figure indicates
the financial scale involved, making it plausible that a handful of foregone business opportunities because
of the friction introduced by Lexis's closed-access model could make it a losing proposition for the state's
economy.
207 See Gross Domestic Productby State: Second Quarter2018 (BEA 18-62) at 8, U.S. BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-ll/qgdpstateI 1l8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PW8-9YRG].
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Such in-between users could be lawyers in other states. For argument's sake, we
can stipulate that most law firms will pay for Westlaw or Lexis. Even so, many law
firms often get state-based subscription packages, which primarily provide access to
in-state statutes and cases. 208 Researching outside the jurisdiction with such packages
incurs substantial extra charges. 209 This means that out-of-state litigators will, in
marginal situations, be deterred from exploring a closed-access state's law for use as
persuasive authority in briefs in other states.210 Thus, at the margins, we can expect
a decrease in the influence of a closed-access state's law beyond that state's borders.
Other productive in-between users would be journalists and scholars.
Government information is fuel for productive journalism and academic research
about governing. This notion has been a key rationale for the open-records and
sunshine laws that are ubiquitous in the United States.2 11 It would be difficult, or
perhaps impossible, to provide a meaningful quantitative estimate of the value of
journalism and academic research that could result from unfettered access to state
law. But I will use myself as an anecdotal example. As a professor at an accredited
law school, I have access to Westlaw and Lexis. But Google and wide-open publicly
212
accessible websites are in many contexts easier to use than Westlaw or Lexis.
Thus, putting anything behind a paywall slows me down, and, like all researchers, I
only have so much time. If I am reaching for an example to use in class or in a paper
I am writing, I will often choose it based on what is most accessible.
Other researchers and teachers will of course do the same.
208 See, e.g., Randy Foreman, Useful Resourcesfor FederalCourt Practice,MICH. B.J., Feb. 2007,

at 46, 46 ("A 'Michigan only' subscription with Lexis or Westlaw tends to be the norm. But most of these
plans, while providing ample Michigan cases and statutes, generally come up somewhat short when it
comes to the federal materials that we need."); Jill Schachner Chanen, Sole Survivor: Going on Your Own
Can Be Scary Unless You Know What to Budget and Where to Look, 84 A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 60, 65
(noting that Westlaw and Lexis offer low-cost subscriptions for solo practitioners, citing the example of
$125 per month for Illinois state and federal unlimited access via Lexis with each additional state costing
$75).
209 Chanen, supra note 208, at 65.
210 A difference in subscription packages may lead to one advantage of large firms and government
law offices over smaller firms and solo practitioners. See, e.g., J. Jason Boyeskie, A Matter of
Opinion: FederalRule of Appellate Procedure32.1 and Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 60 ARK. L.
REv. 955, 972-73 (2008) ("[A] real stratification of client representation is created. Larger firms and
government entities, which can more easily absorb the costs of full electronic access to cases, have a
strategic advantage over smaller firms and individual practitioners that do not have the same resources.
This creates a disparity where larger firms' clients and the government are afforded better representation."
(footnotes omitted)); Sarah Wise, Show Me the Money! The Recoverability of Computerized Legal
Research Expenses by the PrevailingParty in the FederalCircuits, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 456 (2007)
(stating that an annual subscription to a top-of-the-line Westlaw package was $13,512 for a firm of one to
two people, and substantially lower per lawyer at $52,236 for a firm of sixteen to twenty people).
211 See, e.g., Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (2012); Government in the
Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). The purpose
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is to "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of
a democratic society" and "to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny." U.S. Dep't of Justice v.
Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989).
212 Cf Armstrong, supra note 4, at 593 (discussing advantages of linking legal source documents to
create a "seamless web of knowledge that improves upon the practical experience of using reference
sources in paper form").
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While requiring a subscription to get the fullest, quickest, most efficient access
to state law will not transform any state into a dictatorship, it is nonetheless true that
if you put something behind a paywall, you are going to stifle productive thinking
about it. And that is going to decrease debate and democratic participation. It might
be impossible to gauge the size of this effect, but it has been frequently observed that
the best ideas often come to people when they aren't searching for them. If easy,
casual, open browsing of state law is not allowed, we don't know what we are
missing in terms of new ideas to improve law and government. 213
Certainly it is the case that a state that makes its law more accessible will have
more influence in what has been called the "laboratory of democracy." 2 14 As Justice
Brandeis wrote, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 215 That
laboratory of democracy is at its most effective when state legal information-the
"experimental data," to speak in laboratory terms-is not behind paywalls or other
barriers.2 16 It is impractical or impossible to quantify such effects. 21 7 But there is
good reason to think that they are positive and substantial.
CONCLUSION
The law and governmental institutions of the United States can rightfully claim
a special place in the unfolding history of humanity's advances in democracy, liberty,
and the rule of law. Given that mantle, we should probably see it as an embarrassment
that state governments have been lagging behind Hammurabi's policy of 3,700 years
ago of making the written law readily accessible to all. But there is more to it. As
this Article has sought to show, not only does proprietary, closed access make us, in
an important sense, less civically progressive than a Babylonian king, it is also
economically and practically troublesome.
Thinking carefully through the issues with a real-world focus shows that it is
unwarranted to believe that no real harm is done by states fighting to uphold
copyright claims over the law. To the contrary, it is fair to presume that there is
genuine harm done to values of democratic governance as well as to economic
productivity and growth. The snag is that such harms are largely concealed, hidden
in the noise of the marketplace of ideas and in the workings of a big economy. But
these troubles should not be considered de minimis-particularly when compared
213 Cf id. at 594-97 (discussing the benefits of open access to legal scholarship); Benjamin
J. Keele, CopyrightProvisions in Law JournalPublicationAgreements, 102 L. LIBR. J. 269, 270

(2010) (discussing the same).
214 See Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 141; 774 S.E.2d 281, 294 (N.C. 2015) ("IA]n individual state may serve as
a laboratory of democracy and experiment with new legislation in order to meet changing social and economic

needs." (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).

215 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
216 Cf Steven Shavell, Should Copyright ofAcademic Works be Abolished?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
301, 327-29 (2009) (discussing points for and against the impact of free access to scholarly works in
science, and concluding that the positive social benefits from eliminating copyright for these works would
be "substantial").
217 Cf id. (not engaging in a quantitative analysis).
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with the very modest scale of royalties that states receive in their deals with legal
publishers. Instead, state governments should do fresh thinking about the distribution
of the letter of the law, and states should consider that the way to squeeze the most
value out of the law may be to let it go free.

